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Abstract
We analyze productivity-improving mergers in mixed triopoly and explore stable market structures. Solely the
market structures derived by the merger between a public ﬁrm and one of the two private ﬁrms with about 57 percent
shares by the public ﬁrm is in the core.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to provide a theoretical analysis on merger activities in the industry composed of one
public ﬁrm and two private ﬁrms. Such an industry is usually referred to as mixed oligopoly, or more speciﬁcally
mixed triopoly. The literature on mixed oligopoly can be traced back to the paper of De Fraja and Delbono (1989).
The mixed oligopoly is distinguished from the oligopoly composed only of private ﬁrms especially in the objective
of a public ﬁrm. In many existing works on mixed oligopoly, it is assumed that the objective of a public ﬁrm is
social welfare maximization, whereas private ﬁrms aims to maximize their own proﬁts. Since, in the real world,
public ﬁrms are ﬁnanced by tax revenues, it seems quite reasonable to assume that a public is devoted to improving
social welfare. Although there have been many analyses of a merger in private oligopoly (e.g. Salant et al. (1983),
Deneckere and Davidson (1985), and Farrell and Shapiro (1990)), not so many eorts have been carried out in
studying merger activities in mixed oligopoly. Exceptions are Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Ga´rzon (2003), and Coloma (2006).
Both of the papers analyzed a merger in mixed duopoly, i.e. a merger in the industry composed of a public ﬁrm
and a private ﬁrm. In the paper of Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Ga´rzon, the two ﬁrms were assumed to produce heterogeneous
yCorrespondence to: Waseda University, 1-6-1, Nishi-waseda, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 169-8050, Japan. E-mail:
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products and the decision to merge by the ﬁrms was analyzed. On the other hand, in his paper, Coloma considered
the case where the two ﬁrms produce homogeneous products and made welfare comparisons among possible market
structures.
There are two respects in which our paper contributes to the literature on mergers in mixed oligopoly. First,
although neither of the papers of Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Ga´rzon nor of Coloma considered a synergy eect of a merger,
we assume that a merger yields a synergy eect to the technology of the merged ﬁrm and entails the improvement
on productivity. Without assuming any synergy eects of a merger, Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Ga´rzon obtained the result
that, in their setting, both of the private ﬁrm and the public ﬁrm want to merge only when the degree to which the
two heterogeneous products are substitutes is suciently low and, moreover, the merger does not take place when
the two products are perfectly substitutable. Since, in the real world, there are many examples of mergers among
ﬁrms which produce highly substitutable products, this result is counterintuitive to what we would expect. In this
paper, we re-examine the mergers among the ﬁrms producing homogeneous, i.e. perfectly substitutable, products in
mixed triopoly under the assumption that a merger yields the improvement on productivity. It seems very natural to
assume that the merger between the ﬁrms that produce highly substitutable heterogeneous products entails a synergy
eect because merger participants may easily learn a strong point of each ﬁrm’s production skill and/or their patents
from one another. In the study of the horizontal mergers in private oligopoly, Farrell and Shapiro (1990) showed that
the merger could improve social welfare if the merged ﬁrm exploits economies of scale well. In order to analyze
mergers that entail the improvement on productivity, we follow McAfee and Williams (1992). In our paper, the
technology of each of the three ﬁrms is identically represented by the quadratic cost function C(qi) = q2i , where qi is
the amount of the production of the ﬁrm i, and, as considered in the paper of McAfee and Williams, the merged ﬁrm
operates the plants which were previously owned by the pre-merged ﬁrms most eciently and thus the technology
is represented by C(q) = q2=n, where q is the amount of the output of the merged ﬁrm and n (= 2;3) is the number of
the merger participants. Such a cost function of the merged ﬁrm clearly shows that a merger entails the improvement
on productivity.
The other respect in which our analysis is clearly distinguished from the earlier ones is that we especially focus
on the stability of market structures. We extend the usual way of analysis of mergers where solely the decision to
merge by the ﬁrms is discussed. In this paper, we treat merger activities as coalition formations among the ﬁrms
that are allowed to freely merge and freely break o the merger . For example, the merger between ﬁrms, say 0 and
1, with leaving a ﬁrm, say 2, standing alone can be considered as the coalition formation of ff0;1g; f2gg. Viewing
merger activities as coalition formations among the ﬁrms, to ﬁnd the stable coalition formations, i.e. stable market
structures, is of our interest. In order to analyze the stability of market structures, we adopt the core, the well-
established solution concept in cooperative game theory and examine which of all possible market structures is/are
stable in the sense that once any of such market structures is actually realized none of the owners of the ﬁrms wants
to change this present market structure by merging with other ﬁrm or breaking o the merger.
The motivation to analyze the stability problem of merger activities perhaps needs some elaboration. In our
paper, we consider the industry of mixed triopoly. In the mixed triopoly market, the variation of possible forms of
a merger among the ﬁrms increases and becomes more complicated than in mixed duopoly. Consequently, it might
be the case that, while the owners of some two ﬁrms, say 0 and 1, have an incentive to merge into one ﬁrm by
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comparing their payos obtained in each of the initial market structure, i.e. the coalition structure ff0g; f1g; f2gg, and
the one realized after the merger, i.e. f f0,1g ,f 2g g, the owner of the ﬁrm 0 could receive higher payo if s/he breaks
o the merger with the ﬁrm 1 and alternatively merges with the ﬁrm 2, i.e. in the structure ff0;2g; f1gg, than in the
case of the merger with the ﬁrm 1. In this case, if the owner of the ﬁrm 2 also has an incentive to merge with the
ﬁrm 0, the merger between the ﬁrms 0 and 2 will be realized, and the merger between the ﬁrms 0 and 1 can never
be realized. Therefore, in the presence of more than two ﬁrms, it is not sucient to analyze the decision to merge
in each particular case, and we should examine merger activities in terms of stable coalition formations. In the
literature on mergers in private oligopoly, Barros (1998), Horn and Persson (2001), and Straume (2006) adopted the
same approach. However, with the only exception of Kamijo and Nakamura (2007), there has not been any works
that analyze mergers in mixed oligopoly along the approach using the core property. Among these existing works,
there is a slight dierence in the deﬁnitions of core property. The core property considered in this paper is the same
as the one considered in Barros (1998) and Kamijo and Nakamura (2007). We refer the reader to Brito and Gata
(2006) for the detailed discussion about the dierence between the core property adopted by Barros (1998) and the
one considered in Horn and Persson (2001) and Straume (2006). Using the core property a` la Barros (1998) and
Kamijo and Nakamura (2007), this paper shows that, in our mixed triopoly model, the core of market structures is
non-empty and the core consists solely of the market structures derived by the merger between a public ﬁrm and
one of the two private ﬁrms with about 0:57 share ratio by the public ﬁrm.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces our model and presents the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium for each of four regimes; mixed triopoly; merger between private ﬁrms; merger between a public ﬁrm
and a private ﬁrm; and merger among all the three ﬁrms. Our results are provided in Section 3. Section 4 concludes
with some remarks.
2 Model
2.1 Basic Set-up of Mixed Oligopoly
We analyze stable market structures in the industry composed of one public ﬁrm, denoted by 0, and two private
ﬁrms, 1 and 2. Each ﬁrm produces a single homogeneous good and is assumed to be entrepreneurial one, i.e. the
owners themselves make every managerial decision making. The public ﬁrm (resp. each of the private ﬁrms) is
owned by the government (resp. a single private shareholder). In accordance with whether a merger among the
ﬁrms is realized or not, we have four possible market regimes: (a) mixed triopoly ff0g; f1g; f2gg, (b) merger between
private ﬁrms ff0g; f1;2gg, (c) merger between a public ﬁrm and a private ﬁrm ff0; ig; f jgg (i; j = 1;2; i , j), and (d)
merger among all the three ﬁrms ff0;1;2gg. Although the details of the formal descriptions of the four regimes are
slightly dierent, we mainly introduce the set-up of the mixed triopoly. The other regimes are easily understand as
an extension of the mixed triopoly.
As have been usually considered in the literature on mixed oligopoly, the inverse demand function is given as a
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linear function of the total output Q,
P(Q) = a Q; (1)
where a is suciently large positive number. As assumed in Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2003), each ﬁrm i (= 0;1;2)
has an identical technology represented by the quadratic cost function
C(qi) = q2i ; (2)
where qi is the quantity of the good produced by the ﬁrm i. The proﬁt function of the ﬁrm i (= 0;1;2) is given as:
i = (a Q)qi q2i : (3)
As usual, social welfare W is measured by the sum of consumer surplus CS = Q2=2, and ﬁrms’ proﬁts.
In their paper, Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n have not discussed the case where a merger yields the improvement
on productivity. The proiductivity-improving merger has been analyzed in McAfee and Williams (1992). As in the
paper of McAfee andWilliams and also of Nakamura and Inoue (2007) and Heywood and McGinty (2007a; 2007b),
we consider that a merged ﬁrm shows the improvement on productivity. The market regimes derived by mergers,
i.e. (b), (c), and (d), show the dierences particularly in the forms of cost functions. If n (= 2;3) ﬁrms merge into
one ﬁrm, the total cost of the merged ﬁrm Cm is represented as:
Cm(qm) =
q2m
n
; (4)
where qm is the output of the merged ﬁrm m. Such a cost function is supported by the assumption that the merged
ﬁrm adopts the most ecient operation plan of the plants previously owned by the pre-merged ﬁrms. More precisely,
the cost function in (4) corresponds to the case of the most ecient operation rates (1; : : : ;

n) =

1
n ; : : : ;
1
n

of the
plants derived from the total cost minimization problem:
min
(1;:::;n)
nX
i=1
(iqm)2 ; subject to
nX
i=1
i = 1 and i  0 for all i: (5)
The proﬁt of the merged ﬁrm is given by replacing q2i with q
2
m=n in (3).
2.2 Equilibrium Outcomes in the Regimes (a) to (d)
We now examine the Cournot equilibrium for each regimes. Let Uri denote an objective function that the ﬁrm i
maximizes in the regime r (= a;b;c;d). In the rest of the paper, functions and variables with superscript r (= a;b;c;d)
denote those considered in the regime r.
(a) Mixed triopoly ff0g; f1g; f2gg: In this regime, each of the three ﬁrms has the following objective function,
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respectively:
Ua0(q
a
0;q
a
1;q
a
2) =W
a =
1
2
0BBBBBB@qa0+ 2X
i=1
qai
1CCCCCCA
2
+0+
2X
i=1
i; (6)
Uai (q
a
i ;q
a
0;q
a
j ) = i; (i; j = 1;2 and i , j): (7)
The ﬁrst order conditions of the maximization problems give the following Cournot equilibrium:
qa0 =
3
13
a and qai =
2
13
a; (i = 1;2): (8)
Therefore, in the Cournot equilibrium, we obtain the following equilibrium proﬁts ai , consumer surplus, and social
welfare:
a0 =
9
169
a2; ai =
8
169
a2; (i = 1;2); CS a =
49
338
a2; andWa =
99
338
a2:
Notice that, in this regime, the equilibrium proﬁt of the public ﬁrm 0 is larger than those of the private ﬁrms 1 and
2. As has been shown in extensive literature on mixed oligopoly, in the case of quantity competition, a public ﬁrm
whose objective is welfare maximization chooses the output larger than the one by a private ﬁrm, proﬁt maximizer,
because the choice of the output by the public ﬁrm is largely aected by the level of consumer surplus. Consequently,
this leads to the larger market share and higher proﬁt of the public ﬁrm. The payos to the owners of the ﬁrms,
denoted by Vai (i = 0;1;2), are
Va0 =W
a
0 =
99
338
a2; and Vai = 
a
i =
8
169
a2 (i = 1;2):
(b) Merger between private ﬁrms ff0g; f1;2gg: Next, we consider the case where the two private ﬁrms merge
into a new private ﬁrm denoted by 12. Let qb12 be the amount of the output of the merged ﬁrm 12. The objective of
the merged ﬁrm 12 is to maximize its proﬁt:
Ub12(q
b
12;q
b
0) = 12 =
h
a 

qb0+q
b
12
i
qb12 
1
2

qb12
2
: (9)
The objective function of the public ﬁrm is:
Ub0(q
b
0;q
b
12) =W
b =CS b+0+12 (10a)
=
1
2

qb0+q
b
12
2
+
h
a 

qb0+q
b
12
i
qb0 

qb0
2
+
h
a 

qb0+q
b
12
i
qb12 
1
2

qb12
2
: (10b)
Note that, in the last term of its proﬁt function, the merged ﬁrm 12 shows the improvement on productivity. In the
Cournot equilibrium, we obtain the following:
qb0 =
1
4
a; qb12 =
1
4
a; b0 =
1
16
a2; b12 =
3
32
a2; CS b =
1
8
a2; and Wb =
9
32
a2:
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Let  2 [0;1] be a ratio of shareholding by the owner of the ﬁrm 1 in the merged ﬁrm 12. Then, the payo to the
owner of the public ﬁrm 0, Vb0 , and those to the pre-merged private ﬁrms 1 and 2, V
b
1 and V
b
2 , are
Vb0 =W
b =
9
32
a2; Vb1 = 
b
12 =
3
32
a2; and Vb2 = (1 )b12 =
3
32
(1 )a2:
(c) Merger between a public ﬁrm and a private ﬁrm ff0; ig; fjgg: In this regime the public ﬁrm 0 and one of
the private ﬁrms i (= 1 or 2) merge into a new ﬁrm 0i. Let qc0i and 
c
0i denote the output and proﬁt of the merged
ﬁrm 0i. As the objective function of the public-private merged ﬁrm 0i, we consider the weighted average of social
welfare and the proﬁt of the merged ﬁrm:
Uc0i(q
c
0i;q
c
j) = W
c+ (1 )0i (11a)
= 
"
1
2

qc0i+q
c
j
2
+0i+ j
#
+ (1 )0i; (i; j = 1;2 and i , j) (11b)
where  2 [0;1] is a ratio of shareholding by the government in the merged ﬁrm 0i and 0i and  j are the proﬁt
functions of the ﬁrms 0i and j, respectively, given as:
0i =
h
a 

qc0i+q
c
j
i
qc0i 
1
2

qc0i
2
; (12)
Ucj

qcj;q
c
0i



 j =
h
a 

qc0i+q
c
j
i
qcj  

qcj
2
: (13)
The weighted average of social welfare and the proﬁt in the objective of a public-private merged ﬁrm has ﬁrst
been suggested in Matsumura (1998) and also been adopted in Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2003). In the Cournot
equilibrium of this regime, we get:
qc0i =
3
11 4a; q
c
j =
(2 )
11 4a; 
c
0i =
9(3 2)
2(11 4)2 a
2; cj =
2(2 )2
(11 4)2 a
2;
CS c =
(5 )2
2(11 4)2 a
2; and Wc =
(68 44+52)
2(11 4)2 a
2:
The payos to the owners of the pre-merged public ﬁrm 0 and pre-merged private ﬁrm i, Vc0 and V
c
i , are
Vc0 =W
c =
(68 44+52)
2(11 4)2 a
2; and Vci = (1 )c0i =
9(3 2)(1 )
2(11 4)2 a
2;
and the one to the owner of the non-merged private ﬁrm j , i, Vcj , is
Vcj = 
c
j =
2(2 )2
(11 4)2 a
2:
(d) Merger among all the three ﬁrms ff0;1;2gg: Finally, we examine the case where all of the three ﬁrms, 0,
1, and 2, merge into one ﬁrm denoted by 012. In the similar way to the regime (c), the objective function of the
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merged ﬁrm is deﬁned as follows:
Ud012(q
d
012) = W
d + (1 )012 (14a)
= 
"
1
2

qd012
2
+012
#
+ (1 )012; (14b)
where  2 [0;1] is a ratio of shareholding by the government in the merged ﬁrm 012 and 012 is the proﬁt function
of the merged ﬁrm given as:
012 =

a qd012

qd012 
1
3

qd012
2
: (15)
Note that the merged ﬁrm in this regime shows further improvement on productivity than in the regimes (b) and (c).
In the Cournot equilibrium, we obtain the following:
qd012 =
3
8 3a; 
d
012 =
3(4 3)
(8 3)2 a
2; CS d =
9
2(8 3)2 a
2; and Wd =
3(11 6)
2(8 3)2 a
2:
The payos to the owners of the pre-merged ﬁrms, Vdi (i = 0;1;2), are
Vd0 =W
d =
3(11 6)
2(8 3)2 a
2; Vd1 = (1 )d012 =
3(4 3)(1 )
(8 3)2 a
2; and
Vd2 = (1 )(1 )d012 =
3(4 3)(1 )(1 )
(8 3)2 a
2;
where  2 [0;1] measures a ratio of proﬁt distribution among the private sector, i.e. (1 ) is a ratio of shareholding
by the owner of the ﬁrm 1 in the merged ﬁrm 012.
Table 1 summarizes objective functions and payos of the ﬁrms in each of the four regimes.
Table 1: Firms’ objectives and owners’ payos
regime (r) ﬁrms’ objectives: Uri owners’ payos: V
r
i
regime (a)
Ua0 =W
a
Ua1 = 1
Ua2 = 2
Va0 =W
a(qa)
Va1 = 1(q
a)
Va2 = 2(q
a)
regime (b)
Ub0 =W
b
Ub12 = 12
Vb0 =W
b(qb)
Vb1 = 12(q
b)
Vb2 = (1 )12(qb)
regime (c)
Uc0i = W
b + (1 )0i (i = 1;2)
Ucj =  j ( j , i)
Vc0 =W
c(qc)
Vci = (1 )0i(qc)
Vcj =  j(q
c)
regime (d) Ud012 = W
d + (1 )012
Vd0 =W
d(qd)
Vd1 = (1 )012(qd)
Vd2 = (1 )(1 )012(qd)
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2.3 Market Structures and the Core
Each of the four regimes, except for the mixed triopoly which itself represents the market structure, includes more
than one market structure, each of which can be identiﬁed in terms of shareholding ratio in the merged ﬁrm and of
merger participants, i.e. a coalition formation. For example, in the regime (c), we can ﬁnd one particular market
structure that is composed of the merged ﬁrm 01 with the government’s shareholding  = 0:5 and the private ﬁrm
2. Which of the possible market structures will actually occur fairly depends on the managerial decision making of
the three owners of the ﬁrms 0, 1, and 2: merge, not to merge, or break o the merger.
In the preceding subsection, given the market structure that will actually occur as a result of coalition formation
among the owners, we have examined the Cournot equilibrium for each market structure. Now, a natural question
to ask is which of the market structures will occur as a consequence of the owners coalition formation. This
problem can be analyzed in terms of the game of coalition formation among the owners. As discussed in the
introduction, in the case of more than two ﬁrms’ owners, it is not sucient to analyze the decision by the owners
for each particular case, and the stability problem will be of importance. Thus, we especially focus on which
market structure, or coalition formation among the owners, will be stable in the sense that once a market structure
in question is realized, it never shift into any other market structure. To analyze this stability problem we invoke
the core, the well-established solution concept in cooperative game theory. We assume that each of the owners
determines the managerial decision on a merger to maximize her/his own payo Vi. The reader may notice that
the market structures and the payos in our framework corresponds to the feasible allocations and the utilities (or
preferences) in the market game in exchange economy which is well-established topic in microeconomic theory
(see for example, Varian (1992) pp.387-388).
To deﬁne the core of the market structures, we should start with the deﬁnition of a blocking market structure. A
market structure M is said to block another market structure M0 if there exists a deviant coalition of the owner(s)
of the pre-marged ﬁrm(s) such that:
(i)M can be constructed fromM0 by solely the decision by the owner(s) in the deviant coalition, and
(ii) every owner in the coalition achieves strictly higher payo inM than inM0.
An example will help understanding the deﬁnition of blocking. Let Mff0;1g;f2gg
=0:5 be the market structure composed
of the merged ﬁrm 01 with  = 0:5 and the private ﬁrm 2. In this case, for example, the coalition of the owners of
the ﬁrms 0 and 2, f0;2g, can construct, if they want, the new market structure that consists of the merged ﬁrm 02
with  = 0:45 and the private ﬁrm 1, denoted by Mff0;2g;f1gg
=0:45 . If the owner of the ﬁrm 2 gains more payo, i.e. the
distributed proﬁt, and the owner of the ﬁrm 0, i.e. the government, also achieves higher payo, i.e. social welfare,
in the new structureMff0;2g;f1gg
=0:45 than inMff0;1g;f2gg=0:5 , then the structureMff0;2g;f1gg=0:45 blocksMff0;1g;f2gg=0:5 . Note that it is also
possible that a deviant coalition consists of a single owner of a pre-merged ﬁrm. In the above example, it is possible
for each of the owners of the pre-merged ﬁrms 0 and 1 to deviate from the structure by breaking o the merger and
to operate their own pre-merged ﬁrms respectively, i.e. to shift into the mixed triopoly, as well. The core of the
market structures is deﬁned as:
the set of market structures that are never blocked by any other market structure.
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We denote the core of the market structures by Co. If a market structure is in the core, all of the three owners of the
pre-merged ﬁrms have no incentive to construct a new market structure. In this sense, the market structure in the
core can be regarded as the stable one. In the next section, we examine which of the market structures is/are in the
core.
3 Results
We now explore the core of the market structures, i.e. stable structures. Our argument proceeds through some
lemmata, each of which points out the market structures which are blocked by some other market structure. Our
ﬁrst lemma shows that the market structure of the merged ﬁrm 012 is not in the core no matter what a ratio of
shareholding by the pre-merged ﬁrms is adopted.
Lemma 1. For any ratio of shareholding by the three owners of the pre-merged ﬁrms, the market structure of the
merged ﬁrm 012,Mff0;1;2gg; , can not belong to the core, i.e. Mff0;1;2gg; < Co, for any  2 [0;1] and any  2 [0;1].
Proof. The proof proceeds in two steps.
Step 1. LetMff0;1;2gg
2[0;1];= 12
be the market structure of the merged ﬁrm 012 with  2 [0;1] and  = 12 , andMff0;1g;f2gg2[0;1]
be that of the public-private merged ﬁrm 01 and the private ﬁrm 2 with a ratio of shareholding  2 [0;1] in the
merged ﬁrm 01. We will show that the owner of the private ﬁrm 2 wants to deviate from the merger among the three
ﬁrms. Since
dVc2()
d
=
12(2 )
( 11+4)3 a
2 < 0; 8 2 [0;1]; (16)
we have
min
2[0;1]V
c
2() = V
c
2()

=1 =
2
49
a2: (17)
Then, solving the following equation:
Vd2 (;)

= 12
=
2
49
a2; (18)
we obtain the result
Vd2 (;)

= 12
= min
2[0;1]V
c
2() if  =
93 7p41
90
 0:5353: (19)
Since
d
 
Vd2 (;)j= 12
!
d =   3(32 27)2(8 3)3 a2 < 0, 8 2 [0;1], we obtain
Vd2 (;)

= 12
< min
2[0;1]V
c
2(); 8 2
0BBBB@93 7p4190 ;1
377775 : (20)
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Therefore, if  > 93 7
p
41
90 , the owner of the pre-merged ﬁrm 2 deviates fromMff0;1;2gg2[0;1];= 12 and operates her/his own
ﬁrm regardless of what a ratio  is, i.e. Mff0;1g;f2gg
2[0;1] blocks Mff0;1;2gg2[0;1];= 12 . In cases where  ,
1
2 , the same conclusion
also follows for one of the owners of the pre-merged private ﬁrms, 1 or 2, because one of them inevitably receives
strictly less payo than in the case of  = 12 .
Step 2. Let I be the interval

0; 93 7
p
41
90

. To complete the proof, we have to show that Mff0;1;2gg
2I;2[0;1] is blocked
by some other market structure. Consider the market structure of the public-private merged ﬁrm 01 and the private
ﬁrm 2 with a ratio of shareholding  = , i.e. Mff0;1g;f2gg= . We show that the coalition f0;1g has an incentive to deviate
from the merger among the three ﬁrms if = 12 . Let  :R!R be such that (t)= t. When  = 93 7
p
41
90 , the dierence
between the payos to the owner of the ﬁrm 0 across the two market structures is

Vc0(()) Vd0 ()
 
= 93 7
p
41
90
=
25(1024237+79947
p
41)
98(32396969+4258989
p
41)
a2 > 0: (21)
Moreover, we have
d
 
Vc0(()) Vd0 ()

d
=  3(6859 13655+9324
2 26823+2794)
(8 3)3(11 4)3 a
2 < 0; 8 2 [0;1]: (22)
Therefore, the government can achieve higher payo, i.e. higher social welfare, in Mff0;1g;f2gg= than in Mff0;1;2gg2I;= 12 .
Similarly, we obtain the following results on the payo to the owner of the pre-merged ﬁrm 1,

Vc1(()) Vd1 (;)
 
= 93 7
p
41
90 ;=
1
2
=
(2267+51177
p
41)
196(309+14
p
41)2
a2 > 0; (23)
and, for all  2 [0;1],
d

Vc1(()) Vd1 (;)j= 12

d
=  3(5024 8031+5460
2 17593+2164)
2(8 3)3(11 4)3 a
2 < 0: (24)
Thus, the owner of the pre-merged ﬁrm 1 can gain more payo in Mff0;1g;f2gg= than in Mff0;1;2gg2I;= 12 . Thus, the joint
deviation by f0;1g is beneﬁcial to each of the owners of the ﬁrms 0 and 1. The same argument as in the step 1 can
be directly applied to any case of  , 12 to show that the market structures of the merger among the three ﬁrms is
blocked through the joint deviation of the government and one of the owners of the pre-merged private ﬁrms. 
The intuition behind the lemma is explained as follows. In the cases of high values of , the merged ﬁrm 012
sets relatively high output because of the considerable inﬂuence of the owner of the pre-merged public ﬁrm 0, and
this hurts the payos to the owners of the pre-merged private ﬁrms. On the other hand, for low values of , the
merged ﬁrm 012 attaches relatively high importance to its proﬁt, then the owner of the pre-merged public ﬁrm 0
can do better by breaking o the merger. This trade-o in the owners’ interests in the merged ﬁrm 012 makes the
merger unstable. Indeed, as shown in the proof of the lemma, in the case of high values of  2

93 7p41
90 ;1

, either
of the two owners of pre-merged private ﬁrms, say i, has an incentive to deviate from the merged ﬁrm 012. On the
10
other hand, in the case of  2

0; 93 7
p
41
90

, the owners of public ﬁrm 0 has an incentive to break o the merger and
to make an oer of organizing new merged ﬁrm 0i to the one of the two private owners 1 and 2. In both cases, the
key is that the positive eect of the improvement on productivity in the merger among the three ﬁrms is relatively
small to the merger between two ﬁrms.
Next, we provide our second lemma which tells that at least one of the two owners of the pre-merged private
ﬁrms prefers the mixed triopoly rather than the merger between these two private ﬁrms regardless of what a ratio of
the shareholding between them is adopted, i.e. the market structure of the merger between the private ﬁrms is not
in the core no matter what a ratio of shareholding is in the merged ﬁrm.
Lemma 2. For any ratio of shareholding  2 [0;1], the market structure of the merger between the private ﬁrms,
Mff0g;f1;2gg , is blocked by the mixed triopoly,Mff0g;f1g;f2gg.
Proof. Since we have
P2
i=1
a
i =
16
169a
2 > 332a = 
b
12, it is obvious that there exists no  2 [0;1] such that b12 
a1 and (1 )b12  a2. 
This result is due to the strengthened market share of the public ﬁrm. It is known that two-ﬁrm mergers in the
Cournot oligopoly tend often to be unproﬁtable, due to the aggressive response from the ﬁrms not participating
in the merger (see for example, Salant et al. (1983)). Although the private merged ﬁrm 12 gets an advantage of
the improvement on productivity in the current framework, the subsequent expansion of the market share of the
non-merged ﬁrm, the public ﬁrm 0 which aims to maximize not proﬁt but social welfare, becomes larger than in the
case of the private Cournot oligopoly. Consequently, the proﬁt of the merged ﬁrm 12 can not exceed the sum of the
proﬁts gained by the pre-merged private ﬁrms, and the merger between the private ﬁrms will never be beneﬁcial to
the owners of the pre-merged private ﬁrms in the current framework, either.
We now move to our third lemma. While the mixed triopoly, as stated in Lemma 2, blocks the market structures
of the regime (b) and, consequently, excludes them from the core, the following lemma shows that the mixed triopoly
can not belong to the core, either. To state the lemma, we let
 =
638 39p31
739
 0:56950 and ¯ = 6197 39
p
6001
5572
 0:56996: (25)
Lemma 3. The mixed triopoly,Mff0g;f1g;f2gg, is blocked by the market structure of the public-private merged ﬁrm 0i
and the private ﬁrm j , i,Mff0;ig;f jgg , if the ratio of shareholding  in the merged ﬁrm 0i is in the interval

; ¯

.
Proof. In the Cournot equilibrium of each of the regimes (a) and (c), we have
Va0 =
99
338
a2; Vc0 =
(68 44+52)
2(11 4)2 a
2; Vai =
8
169
a2; and Vci =
9(3 2)(1 )
2(11 4)2 a
2:
Thus, we obtain the following:8>>>><>>>>:0    ) V
a
0  Vc0
 <   1) Va0 < Vc0
and
8>>>><>>>>:0   < ¯) V
c
i > V
a
i
¯    1) Vci  Vai :
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Thus, each of the owners of 0 and i have an incentive to jointly found the merged ﬁrm 0i if the shareholding ratio 
is in
h
0; ¯

\

;1
i
=

; ¯

. 
As we have just shown in the proof of Lemma 3, if the ratio of shareholding by the government is more than ,
i.e.  > , the government will agree to the merger with a private ﬁrm i since she can achieve higher social welfare
by the positive eect of productivity improvement. On the other hand, the owner of the pre-merged private ﬁrm i
can gain more payo in the merged ﬁrm 0i than in the mixed triopoly whenever  < ¯. Therefore, for any  2

; ¯

,
both of the two owners have an incentive to merge into a new public-private ﬁrm 0i. From this observation, we
immediately obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 4. The mixed triopoly, Mff0g;f1g;f2gg, blocks the market structure of the public-private merged ﬁrm 0i and
the private ﬁrm j , i,Mff0;ig;f jgg , whenever the ratio of shareholding  in the merged ﬁrm 0i is in
h
0;

or

¯;1
i
, i.e.
 2
h
0;

[

¯;1
i
.
Proof. This lemma immediately follows from the proof of Lemma 3 where we have shown that if  2

¯;1
i
resp.
h
0;

then the owner of the private ﬁrm i (resp. the owner of the public ﬁrm 0) has an incentive to deviate
and change the present market structure into the mixed triopoly. 
From Lemmata 1 to 4, we now know that almost all market structures can not be in the core. The market
structures that belong to any of the regimes (a), (b), and (d) are not in the core. Moreover, in the regime (c),
the market structures with  2
h
0;

[

¯;1
i
can not belong to the core, either. As a consequence, the remaining
candidates that could belong to the core are the market structures of the public-private merged ﬁrm 0i and the
private ﬁrm j , i, with the ratio of shareholding by the government  2
h
; ¯
i
. We now state our main result, which
shows that any of these market structures is in the core.
Proposition 1. The market structure of the public-private merged ﬁrm 0i and the private ﬁrm j , i, Mff0;ig;f jgg ,
is in the core whenever the ratio of shareholding in the merged ﬁrm 0i, , is in the closed interval
h
; ¯
i
, i.e.
Mff0;ig;f jgg 2 Co, 8 2
h
; ¯
i
.
Proof. See Appendix. 
From this proposition, it can be concluded that the market structures of the public-private merged ﬁrm 0i and
the private ﬁrm j , i with  2
h
; ¯
i
are stable in the sense that any of these market structures is never blocked by
the other market structures. In other words, once any of these structures is realized, it will never be replaced by
any of the other market structures. It should be emphasized that the interval of the admissible ratio  in the coreh
; ¯
i
is very short, ¯    0:00047. This result is fairly remarkable in that it shows a considerable contrast to
the result obtained in Kamijo and Nakamura (2007). In their paper, Kamijo and Nakamura analyzed the industry
composed by two symmetric private ﬁrms and a less ecient public ﬁrm. Assuming that each of the three ﬁrms
has constant marginal cost of production, Kamijo and Nakamura showed that all of the four regimes, except for the
regime (b), have the market structures that belong to the core. Therefore, it can be said that the stable mergers in
mixed oligopoly crucially depend on the assumptions of ﬁrms’ technology.
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Finally, we brieﬂy examine the case where the industry is composed only of private ﬁrms, i.e. private oligopoly,
and compare the results between mixed oligopoly and private oligopoly. In the case of private oligopoly, we need
to change the model summarized in Table 1 as follows: Ua0 = 0; V
a
0 = 0(q
a); Ub0 = 0; V
b
0 = 0(q
b); Uc0i = 0i;
Vc0 = 0i(q
c); Ud012 = 012; and V
d
0 = 012(q
d). Consequently, the regimes (b) and (c) become the same ones,
and we let the regime (b) represent them. The Cournot equilibria of the regimes (a), (b) and (d) are obtained as:
(qai ;q
a
1 ;q
a
2 ) =
a
6
;
a
6
;
a
6

; (qb0 ;q
b
12) =
 
2
11
a;
3
11
a
!
; and qd012 =
3
8
a:
Then, the payos to the owners are determined as follows:
(Va0 ;V
a
1 ;V
a
2 ) =
 
a2
18
;
a2
18
;
a2
18
!
; (Vb0 ;V
b
1 ;V
b
2 ) =
 
8
121
a2;
27
242
a2;
27
242
(1 )a2
!
; and
(Vd0 ;V
d
1 ;V
d
2 ) =
 
3
16
a2;
3
16
(1 )a2; 3
16
(1 )(1 )a2
!
:
Given the above payos, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 2. In the case where the industry is composed only of private ﬁrms, none of the market structures
belongs to the core, i.e. Co = ?.
Proof. The proof is similar to those of Lemmata 1 to 4. Thus, we limit ourselves to providing the examples
of blocking market structures for each market structure. For the regime (a), Mff0g;f1g;f2gg is blocked by Mff0g;f1;2gg
whenever  2

121
243 ;
122
243

. For the regime (b), Mff0g;f1;2gg is blocked (i) by Mff0g;f1g;f2gg if  2
h
0; 121243

or  2

122
243 ;1
i
;
and (ii) byMff0;1;2gg; with  = 925 and 12 if  2
h
121
243 ;
122
243
i
. For the regime (d),Mff0;1;2gg
= 13 ;=
1
2
is blocked byMff0g;f1;2gg with
 2 [0;1]. By the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 1, the case of (;) =

1
3 ;
1
2

is sucient to complete the
proof of the regime (d). 
The never-ending coalition formation increases transaction costs unboundedly. Furthermore, it eliminates our
ability to predict which of the market structure will actually occur, which also means that it is hardly possible to
prescribe economic policies in a eective way. Comparing Propositions 1 and 2, we can conclude that the presence
of the public ﬁrm has a stabilizing eect in the current framework and allows us to avoid such undesirable costs.
4 Concluding remarks
This paper explored the stable market structures in mixed oligopoly when a single public ﬁrm and two symmetric
private ﬁrms in the homogeneous good market are allowed to freely merge and freely break o the merger. We
adopted the core as the solution concept to analyze the stability of market structures. We showed that the core
consists solely of the market structures derived by the merger between a public ﬁrm and one of the two private ﬁrms
with the shareholding ratio by the public ﬁrm, , which is greater than   0:56950 and less than ¯  0:56996. These
market structures are stable in the sense that, by the deﬁnition of the core, once any of these market structures is
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actually realized, it never be replaced by any of the other market structures. The admissible interval of  that ensures
the stability of market structures is very short. This strong result fairly relies on the assumption that a merger yields
the improvement on productivity. Without such a positive eect of a merger, our result would change and the mixed
triopoly would be a unique stable market structure.
Two interesting extensions of our model remain. The ﬁrst is to consider the model in which the foreign share-
holders are taken into account. In the real world, some ﬁrms are foreign-owned. In this case, social welfare that
the government is to maximize should not include the proﬁts of the foreign-owned ﬁrms. Thus, the existence of the
foreign shareholders will change the public ﬁrm’s decision making and, consequently, the equilibrium outcomes as
well. The other possible extension is to introduce the asymmetricity among the production technologies of ﬁrms
in a way like C(q) = kiq2i . In the present paper, we assumed that all the three ﬁrms have identical technologies
(k0;k1;k2) = (1;1;1). It seems more natural to assume that a public ﬁrm shows inecient performance relatively to
private ﬁrms, e.g. X-ineciency in a public ﬁrm. In the case of (k0;k1;k2) = (3;1;1), the reader may easily check
that the core becomes empty in the similar method to the proofs of Lemmata 1 to 4 and Proposition 2. The analysis
of more general cases of k = (k0;k1;k2) and the comparison among dierent values of the weight k is left for future
reseach.
Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1
Let Mff0;ig;f jgg
2[;¯] be the market structure of the merged ﬁrm 0i with a ratio of shareholding  2 [; ¯] and the private
ﬁrm j (, i). In a series of claims below, we will show thatMff0;ig;f jgg
2[;¯] is never blocked by any other market structure.
We assume, without loss of generality, i = 1 and j = 2.
Claim 1. Mff0;1g;f2gg
2[;¯] is never blocked by the mixed triopoly in any case of  2
h
; ¯
i
.
By Lemma 3,Mff0;1g;f2gg
2[;¯] is not blocked by the mixed triopoly if  2

; ¯

. Moreover, in the proof of Lemma 3, we
have shown that, in the case of  = , the government inMff0;1g;f2gg= can achieve the same level of social welfare as in
the mixed triopoly, and thus the government has no incentive to deviate fromMff0;1g;f2gg
2[;¯] , and also that the owner of
the pre-merged ﬁrm 1 inMff0;1g;f2gg= gains more payo than in the mixed triopoly. Thus, neither of these two owners
want to break o the merger. The case of  = ¯ can be proved by the symmetric argument to the case of  = .
Claim 2. Mff0;1g;f2gg
2[;¯] is never blocked by the market structure of the public ﬁrm 0 and the private merged ﬁrm 12
with  2 [0;1],Mff0g;f1;2gg
2[0;1] , in any case of  2 [0;1].
By (16), Vc2() is decreasing on [0;1], and thus we have
min
2[;¯]
Vc2() = V
c
2(¯) =
(1649+13
p
6001)2
1352(234+
p
6001)2
a2: (26)
When  = ¯ inMff0;1g;f2gg
2[;¯] , i.e. inM
ff0;1g;f2gg
=¯
, the owner of the private ﬁrm 2 will agree with the merger between the
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two private ﬁrms if and only if
Vb2 () > V
c
2(¯),
3
32
(1 )a2 > (1649+13
p
6001)2
1352(234+
p
6001)2
a2 (27a)
,  < 401707 1768
p
6001
621075
 0:4263: (27b)
On the other hand, we obtain the following result on the payos to the ﬁrm 1: for any  < 401707 1768
p
6001
621075 ,
Vb1 () Vc1(¯) =
3
32
a2  8
169
a2 (28a)
<
3
32
a2

= 401707 1768
p
6001
621075
  8
169
a2 (28b)
=
88107 1768p6001
6624800
a2   0:0074a2 < 0: (28c)
Thus, by (27b) and (28c), the joint deviation by the owners of the ﬁrms 1 and 2 can not be realized if  = ¯. Since
Vc2 is decreasing with respect to , by (27a) to (28c) altogether, the joint deviation by the owners of the private ﬁrms
is still impossible in any case of  2
h
; ¯

.
Claim 3. Mff0;1g;f2gg
2[;¯] is never blocked byM
ff0;2g;f1gg
02[0;1] in any case of 
0 2 [0;1].
We start with the case of  = ¯ in Mff0;1g;f2gg
2[;¯] . In this case, the owner of the ﬁrm 2 prefers M
ff0;2g;f1gg
02[0;1] rather than
Mff0;1g;f2gg
=¯
if and only if the payo, i.e. the distributed proﬁt, inMff0;2g;f1gg
02[0;1] is strictly greater than the payo, i.e. the
stand-alone proﬁt, gained inMff0;1g;f2gg
=¯
, i.e. the following value, (0), must be positive:
(0) := (1 0)c02(0) c2(¯) (29a)
=
9(3 20)(1 0)
2(11 40)2 a
2  (1649+13
p
6001)2
1352(234+
p
6001)2
a2 (29b)
= a2 (0); (29c)
where(0)=
h
28(12134951+89440
p
6001)(0)2 2(379922845+2615912p6001)0+328599497+1677091p6001
i
=
h
676(234+
p
6001)2(11 40)2
i
. Solving the equation (0) = 0 subject to 0 2 [0;1], we obtain
0 =
 
379922845+2615912
p
6001 39
q
31920488675573+391144962052
p
6001
!
339778628+2504320
p
6001
 0:5151: (30)
Since
d(0)
d0
=
d((1 0)c02(0))
d0
=  9(31 24
0)
2(11 40)3 a
2 < 0; 80 2 [0;1]; (31)
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we obtain the intermediate result that the owner of the ﬁrm 2 prefersMff0;2g;f1gg
02[0;1] toMff0;1g;f2gg=¯ if and only if
0 2 0;0 : (32)
On the other hand, since we have
dVc0()
d
=
3(10 11)
(11 4)3 a
2 > 0; 8 2 [0; ¯]   ) [0;0]; (33)
the owner of the public ﬁrm 0 strictly prefers Mff0;1g;f2gg
=¯
rather than Mff0;2g;f1gg
0 if 
0 < 0 (< ¯), and thus the joint
deviation by the owners of the ﬁrms 0 and 2 fromMff0;1g;f2gg
=¯
can never be realized. Note that, from (16), the proﬁt
(or payo to the owner) of the ﬁrm 2 in Mff0;1g;f2gg
2[;¯] is decreasing with respect to , which in turn implies that, by
(29a) to (29c) and (31), a decrease in  leads to a decrease in 0. Thus, from the fact that 0 <  and (33), the owner
of the ﬁrm 0 never agrees with the joint deviation with the owner of the ﬁrm 2 in any case of  2 [; ¯).
Claim 4. Mff0;1g;f2gg
2[;¯] is never blocked by the merger among the three ﬁrms M
ff0;1;2gg
2[0;1];2[0;1] regardless of what the
ratios  2 [0;1] and  2 [0;1] are.
We start with the case of  = . In this case, we have Vc0() =
99
338a
2. Since
dVd0 ()
d =
27(1 )
(8 3)3 a
2  0 for all  2 [0;1]
(equality holds only in the case of  = 1),
Vd0 () Vc0



=
3(11 9)( 23+33)
338(8 3)2 a
2 > 0; 8 2
 
23
33
;1
#
: (34)
On the other hand, we obtain the following result on the payo to the owner of the pre-merged private ﬁrm 2:
d(Vd2 (;)j=0)
d
=
3(32 27)
( 8+3)3 a
2 < 0; 8 2 [0;1] (35)
and
Vd2 (;)

= 2333 ;=0
 Vc2() =
4(817 260p31)
616005
a2   0:0041a2 < 0: (36)
Note that the case of  = 0 is the most favorable case of  for the owner of the pre-merged private ﬁrm 2. Hence,
in the case of  = , by (34) to (36), the owners of the pre-merged public ﬁrm 0 and pre-merged private ﬁrm 2 can
never reach an agreement about the shareholding in the merged ﬁrm 012, and thus the merger among the three ﬁrms
can never be realized. Now, we examine the other cases of  2
h
; ¯
i
, i.e.  2

; ¯
i
. By (33), the value of  which
solves the equation Vd0 () Vc0() = 0 increases in any case of  2

; ¯
i
than in the case of  = , i.e.  > 2333 . From
16
(16) and (35), we have
Vd2 (
; )j=0 Vc2()

2(;¯] < V
d
2 (;)

= 2333 ;=0
 Vc2(¯) (37a)
=
13739 221p6001
828100
a2   0:0041a2 < 0: (37b)
Therefore, by the same argument as in the case of  = , the merger among the three ﬁrms is impossible in any case
of  2

; ¯
i
.
From (33) and the fact that
dVc1()
d =   9(31 24)2(11 4)3 a2 < 0, 8 2 [0;1], any alteration on the ratio  never improves the
payos to both owners of the ﬁrms 0 and 1 simultaneously. Therefore, combining the assertions of the claims, we
have successfully shown thatMff0;1g;f2gg is in the core whenever  is in the closed interval
h
; ¯
i
. 
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